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Abstract. We show that an attack based on the linear decomposition
method introduced by the author can be efficiently applied to the new
version of the MOR scheme proposed in [1]. We draw attention to some
inaccuracies in the description of this version. We show how the action
of an exponent of a given automorphism (for example, the action of its
inverse) can be calculated, and we also show how the unknown exponent
of automorphism can be calculated if we go over to the corresponding
linear transformation. This method can be applied to different matrix
groups over an arbitrary constructive field. It does not depend on the
specific properties of the underlined matrix group. The considered prob-
lem is reduced in probabilistic polynomial time to the similar problem
in small extensions of the underlined field.
1. Introduction
In [1], S. Bhunia, A. Mahalanobis, P. Shinde and A. Singh study the
ElGamal-type version of the MOR cryptosystem with symplectic and or-
thogonal groups over finite fields Fq of odd characteristics. The MOR cryp-
tosystem over SL(d,Fq) was previously investigated by the second of these
authors. In that case, the hardness of the MOR cryptosystem was found to
be equivalent to the discrete logarithm problem in Fqd . It is shown in [1]
that the MOR cryptosystem over Sp(d, q) has the security of the discrete
logarithm problem in Fqd. The MOR cryptosystem also studied in [2] and
in [3], and was cryptanalyzed in [4].
Recall, that the El-Gamal system can be described as follows: Let G be
a public finite cyclic group with generator g, and let x ∈ Z is Alices private
key. The element gx is public. To send a message m ∈ G, Bob picks a
random integer y and sends the cipher text c = (gy, gxym) to Alice. To
decrypt, Alice calculates (gy)x = gxy and inverts it to retrieve m. There are
a couple of cryptosystem of the ElGamal-type. See, for example, [5], [6]. The
versions proposed in [7] and [8] were analyzed in [9]. See also cryptanalysis
in [10].
We are to show that the version of MOR in [1] is not entirely accurate.
It should be supplemented with an additional assumption. The equivalence
theorem there should be clarified too.
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We also show that the proposed ElGamal-type version of MOR over any
finitely generated matrix group G ≤ GL(d,Fq) is vulnerable with respect to
the linear decomposition attack in any case when the automorphism ϕ can
be naturally extended to a linear transformation of the linear space LinFq(G)
generated by G in M(d,F). For example, if ϕ is an inner automorphism. In
fact, there exists an efficient algorithm to compute the original message by
the its ciphertext. It can be done for every constructive field, i.e., a field
for which all operations are efficient, and the Gauss elimination process is
efficient too.
2. Description of the ElGamal version of the MOR
cryptosystem in [1].
Let G =< g1, g2, ..., gn > be a (finite) public group and ϕ a non-trivial
public automorphism of G.
Alices keys are as follows:
Private Key: t, t ∈ N.
Public Key: ({ϕ(gi) : i = 1, ..., n} and {ϕ
t(gi) : i = 1, ..., n}).
We suppose that Alice is the recipient of the messages and Bob is com-
municating with Alice. Let m ∈ G be a message.
Algorithm:
Encryption.
To send the message (plaintext) m Bob picks up a random integer r, then
he computes {ϕr(gi) : i = 1, ..., n} and ϕ
tr(m).
The ciphertext is ({ϕr(gi), i = 1, ..., n}, ϕ
tr(m)).
Decryption.
Since Alice knows t, she computes ϕtr(gi) from ϕ
r(gi) and then ϕ
−tr(gi)
(i = 1, ..., n). Finally, the message m can be computed by ϕ−tr(ϕtr(m)) =
m.
Remark 2.1. There is one obstacle to the implementation of the decryption
process. To recover m, Alice should to compute {ϕ−tr(gi) : i = 1, ..., n} by
{ϕtr(gi) : i = 1, ..., n}, or to compute it by ϕ
r. It can be done if she knows
ϕ−1, i.e., {ϕ−1(gi) : i = 1, ..., n}.
In the general case, the calculation of the inverse automorphism is not
obvious efficient process. We have to assume that Alice can do it, for exam-
ple, because she knows s ∈ N such that ϕs = id. It happens, in particular,
if she knows the order s1 of ϕ or the order s2 of Aut(G). Then ϕ
−1 = ϕs−1
(s = s1 or s = s2). Also Alice can know ϕ
−1.
Alice can simultaneously build ϕ and ϕ−1 during the setting of parameters
of the protocol.
This obstacle manifests itself more significantly in the proof of the follow-
ing theorem. We give them in the original form.
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”Theorem ([1], Theorem 2.1). The hardness to break the above MOR
cryptosystem is equivalent to the Diffie-Hellman problem in the group <
ϕ >.
Proof. It is easy to see that if one can break the Diffie-Hellman problem,
then one can compute ϕtr from ϕt in the public-key and ϕr in the ciphertext.
This breaks the system.
On the other hand, observe that the plaintext is m = ϕ−tr(ϕtr(m)).
Assume that there is an oracle that can break the MOR cryptosystem, i.e.,
given ϕ,ϕt and a ciphertext (ϕr, f) will deliver ϕ−tr(f). Now we query the
oracle n times with the public-key and the ciphertexts (ϕr(gi), gi) for i =
1, ..., n. From the output, one can easily find ϕ−tr(gi) for i = 1, 2, ..., n.
So we just witnessed that for ϕr(gi) and ϕ
t(gi) for i = 1, ..., n, one can
compute ϕ−tr(f) for every f = f(g1, ..., gn) using the oracle. This solves the
Diffie-Hellman problem.”
Remark 2.2. In the first part of the proof one computes ϕtr, but he needs
in ϕ−tr to compute m in the protocol. It can be not so easy to do. There
are some cryptographic schemes based on the complexity of the problem of
finding the inverse to a given automorphism.
3. Cryptanalysis
We propose the following cryptanalysis that works in the case of an arbi-
trary (constructive) field too. For simplicity we assume that the underlined
field is finite.
Suppose that the ElGamal-type system MOR is considered over a finitely
generated matrix group G ≤ GL(d,Fq). Then G ⊆ M(d,Fq). Let G =<
g1, ..., gn > . We suppose that ϕ can be naturally extended to a linear
transformation of V =LinFq(G) that is a linear subspace generated by G
in M(d,Fq). It happens for example, if ϕ is an inner automorphism of G.
Note, that the case of inner automorphism ϕ is considered in [1] as the most
significant.
To reveal m using only open protocol data, we perform the following
actions.
Step 1. Let Vi (i ∈ {1, ..., n}) be the subspace of V generated by all
elements of the form ϕk(gi) for k ∈ Z. There is a basis of Vi of the form
e1(i) = ϕ
0(gi) = gi, e2(i) = ϕ(gi), ..., eli (i) = ϕ
li−1(gi). It can be efficiently
constructed as follows.
Initially, we include e1(i) = gi in the constructing basis. Then we check
whether ϕ(gi) belongs to the linear subspace generated by e1(i). If not, then
we add e2(i) = ϕ(gi) to the basis under construction. Let e1(i), ..., ej(i) is
a constructed part of the basis. Then we check whether ϕj(gi) = ϕ(ej(i))
belongs to the linear subspace generated by e1(i), ..., ej(i). If not, then we
add ej+1(i) = ϕ
j(gi) to the basis under construction, and continue. If so, we
stop the process and claim that the basis is constructed and li = j. Indeed, a
linear presentation of ϕj(gi) via e1(i), ..., ej (i) after applying ϕ gives a linear
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presentation of ϕj+1(gi) via e2(i), ..., ej(i), ϕ
j(gi), and so via e1(i), ..., ej(i).
This argument works for every j + v, v ≥ 1. Similarly we can obtain the
linear decomposition of each ϕ−v(gi), v ≥ 1.
Step 2. For each i = 1, ..., n, we have constructed a basis e1(i), ..., eli (i),
where ej+1(i) = ϕ
j(gi), j = 0, ..., li−1, of Vi. Each subspace Vi is ϕ-invariant.
In general case li ≤ d
2.
In [1], the authors single out as the main the case of inner automorphism
ϕ.
They write:
”The purpose of this section is to show that for a secure MOR cryp-
tosystem over the classical Chevalley and twisted orthogonal groups, we
have to look at automorphisms that act by conjugation like the inner auto-
morphisms. There are other automorphisms that also act by conjugation,
like the diagonal automorphism and the graph automorphism for odd-order
orthogonal groups. Then we argue what is the hardness of our security
assumptions.”
Then they note that by Dieudonne Theorem, ϕ = σιηγθ, where σ is a
central automorphism, ι is an inner automorphism, η is a diagonal automor-
phism, γ is a graph automorphism, and θ is a field automorphism.
Then they continue:
”The group of central automorphisms is too small and the field automor-
phisms reduce to a discrete logarithm in the field Fq. So there is no benefit
of using these in a MOR cryptosystem. Also there are not many graph auto-
morphisms in classical Chevalley and twisted orthogonal groups other than
special linear groups and oddorder orthogonal groups. In the odd-order or-
thogonal groups, these automorphisms act by conjugation. Recall here that
our automorphisms are presented as action on generators. It is clear ([8],
Section 7) that if we can recover the conjugating matrix from the action on
generators, the security is a discrete logarithm problem in Fqd , or else the
security is a discrete logarithm problem in F
qd
2 .”
In our cryptanalysis we suppose that ϕ can be naturally extended to an
automorphism of the linear space V . This happens if ϕ is an inner or field
automorphism, or induced by an inner automorphism of GL(d,Fq).
We come back to the introduced above subspaces Vi, i = 1, ..., n. For a
fixed Vi, denote by ϕi the linear map of Vi induced by ϕ. The matrix A(ϕi)
of ϕi in the basis Ei = {e1(i), ..., eli (i)} has the form
A(ϕi) =


0 1 0 ... ... 0
0 0 1 0 ... 0
... ... ... ... ... ...
0 ... ... ... 0 1
α1 α2 ... ... ... αli


,
where ϕ(eli(i)) =
∑li
k=1 αkek(i), αk ∈ Fq.
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By the way we can efficiently compute for each i the value ϕ−1(gi) corre-
sponding to the first row of A(ϕi)
−1. So we can compute ϕ−1.
Now we know matrices A(ϕi)
±1, A(ϕi)
±r, A(ϕi)
±t, i = 1, ..., n, and we
need to compute r or t. Then we can compute ϕ−rti and recover m. We can
provide sufficient computation using only one or several matrices above.
In [11], it was shown how the discrete logarithm problem in some special
class of matrices can be reduced to the discrete logarithm problem in some
extensions of the underlying field. In [12], these results were extended to
show how the discrete logarithm problem in every group GL(d,Fq) can be
reduced in probabilistic polynomial time to the similar problem in small ex-
tensions of Fq. The case of a finitely generated nilpotent group is considered
in [13].
We see that matrix groups over finite fields offer no significant advantage
for the implementation of cryptographic protocols whose security is based
on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms.
The described cryptanalysis has many analogues, presented in [14]-[16]. In
[17], a general scheme based on multiplications is presented. It corresponds
to a number of cryptographic systems known in the literature, which are also
vulnerable to attacks by the linear decomposition method. The nonlinear
decomposition method was invented in [18]. The nonlinear method can be
applied when the group chosen as the platform for a cryptographic scheme
is not linear or the least degree of their representability by matrices is too
big for efficient computations. See details in [10].
A protection against linear algebra attacks was recently invented in [19].
It is described in the case of the Anshel et al. cryptographic scheme [20] but
can be applied to the Diffie-Hellman-type and some other schemes too. See
abstract [21] and paper [22].
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